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Abstract 
Of great interest to organizational theorists are problems that arise within the sense-
making domain. The paper introduces two important theories, both of which were 
results of empirical work. These are the theory of mundane reason and that of 
epistemic cultures. These theories together have a powerful impact on organizational 
theory. Building upon what we know, a Theory of Mundane Reason and Epistemic 
Culture is proposed. It is suggested that this constructivist approach to research may 
be justified as a meta-ontology. Mundane reason has been chosen because it has both 
a factuality and universality. Consequences of this include assumptions that directly 
impact on the ability to penetrate others’ reality. This in turn impacts upon the ability 
to communicate effectively. Traditional models of communication used in the 
literature of management and marketing were a product of their time. Theories like 
the one presented here allow a re-thinking and re-theorising of communication models 
such as the one chosen as the example in the paper. The paper concludes with a 
formula for analysing faulty communication resulting from an unawareness of 
mundane reason and epistemic cultures. 
 
 






“A theory, as I teach in my class, has to fit all the facts. If it doesn’t, you have 
to examine the facts. If the facts are correct, and the theory doesn’t work, then 
you have to alter the theory.”     DeMille N. (1997:357)  
 
How is it that some gaps are hardly ever bridged? Take for example, a set of 
senior managers who have spent some time away at a retreat or a special meeting 
room formulating a strategy for the future. After two days of very hard work, the 
strategy is formulated. Knowing from past experience that sometimes these things 
are not followed through, the group has spent some time on developing 
comprehensive action plans of the ‘who does what, when and how’ variety.  
 
The time comes to pass the strategy down the line. Achieving clarity is a special 
consideration and the communication is done with much and enthusiasm. In spite of 
attempts to make the strategy as clear as possible, it seems somewhat difficult to 
transmit the spirit of the strategy across the various work groups tasked with 
implementing the strategy. Coming together for the senior executive meeting, there 
are war stories from all fronts. “What does it take for these people to show some 
ownership?” one of the executives asked. “We have bent over backwards to be 
integrative, to keep our people in the information loop through meetings and 
presentations and team briefings”. 
 
This paper uses two theoretical perspectives to argue that facts are actually socially 
constructed things. Attached to a fact is the world of reasoning within which the fact 
is incorporated. Groups of people, often unconsciously, develop basic and meaningful 
structures through which the factuality1 of descriptions is built and used to inform 
ongoing consciousness as well as day-to-day activities (Potter 1996). To use the 
example of the decision makers, the executives have developed their own ways of 
structuring meaning so that, for them, facts emerge. They have basic procedures that 
allow them to construct and legitimate what makes up ‘a fact’. The procedures 
provide a window into the factual world of the senior executives. 
 
                                                 
1 ‘Factuality’ is used here s a noun meaning restricted to or based on fact Longman (1984). 
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As will be discussed later in more detail, there are two assumptions that accompany 
these constructions. The first assumption, it is argued here, is the fulcrum around 
which many of the dilemmas such as the one above revolve. The assumption made by 
the senior executives is that there is one objective world of facts shared with the 
various work groups, who might include, say, engineers, administrators or customers. 
Not only that but, holds the second assumption, this is a factual world we are talking 
about and these other groups have access to it in such a way that they can actually 
experience it. What the senior managers fail to realise is that their ‘real’ world is what 
Morgan (1997) calls a ‘partial’ world-view. Each of the other groups who will be 
implementing the strategy mentioned in the example above will also have a partial 
world-view. These views are not transferable and all have their own mundane 
reasoning procedures and epistemic cultures2. 
 
There is a big difference between the effects of this theory of the world-view and the 
conventional psychology of perception which are familiar to most of us. It is widely 
accepted that people perceive things in different ways. In many ways the perception 
argument is easier for the senior executive in our example to deal with than the 
factuality one of mundane reason. The executive is aware that other groups might see 
the world differently, but within the same world-view. S/he will go to some trouble to 
gather others’ perceptions. The difference in understanding the ‘reasoning’ or 
factuality gap and understanding the ‘perception’ gap is a big one. I might ‘come to 
where you are’ and try to find out how you see things but I can only do that in the 
confidence that we share the same factual world. It is something like the difference 
between part of the same world but in a different way and being part of a different 
world. Strangely, the more successful we are at exploring and gathering perceptions, 
the less likely we are to look for and deal with the factuality gap. A central 
characteristic of the factuality assumption is that there is a sense of realism to it. This 
realism is assumed to extend to other groups. The senior executives assume their ‘real 
world’ extends to other groups and other groups do the same.  
 
                                                 
2 An epistemic culture is “those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms … which, in a 
given field, make up how we know what we know. Epistemic cultures are cultures that create 
and warrant knowledge…” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999:1) 
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A rather poignant example is the case of the criminal who is being tried in the 
courtroom. The judge, lawyers, clerk of the court, other officials and the criminal all 
have access to the physical characteristics and procedures of the courtroom. In this 
sense they are sharing an objective world. People who have sat in on courtroom 
sessions may have observed that judges appear to assume that the criminal also shares 
the same reasoning that is going on as the trial develops. The only problem is that the 
criminal exists within his/her own world of reasoning. The criminal’s organizing 
framework for judging which descriptions make up factual accounts of reality and 
which ones do not is based on the world of reason adopted in the criminal world. The 
criminals assume that the courtroom officials inhabit the same factual world as they 
do (although they might acknowledge that they are on different sides within the same 
reasoning world).  
 
In the two examples above, and many more could be found in most organizations, 
there is no awareness of the need to penetrate the factual world of others. The 
assumption is that ‘we all share the same one’. We just see things differently within a 
shared world - not of meaning, but of fact. 
 
There is a second issue that we would like to present. That is the issue of knowledge. 
Within our mundane reasoning worlds, how do we know what we know and what sort 
of knowledge is valued over other sorts? The researcher who demonstrated the 
existence of epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) used scientists as her example. 
We will discuss this in more detail later but as an introduction, we would mostly agree 
that scientists ‘know’ what they know through the organizing frameworks that allow 
the factuality of their scientific descriptions to emerge. Descriptions that match the 
‘rules’ of scientific method will be accorded the status of objectivity and factuality. 
Those that do not, for example, where descriptions have been contaminated by some 
‘subjective’ factor, will not be considered as ‘real’. Concerning what sort of 
knowledge is valued to this group of mundane reasoners has been made very 
transparent to us since our schooldays. Within the mundane reasoning world of 
scientists, objective, factual concrete kind of knowledge is highly valued whilst for 
the subjective, perceptual kind this is not the case. What do such scientific researchers 
do when confronted with highly qualitative researchers? Literature will show that they 
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apply the criteria for scientific research (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). They judge the 
qualitative research by these standards and, inevitably find it wanting.  
 
The task of research in management is to make sense of social life in the organisation. 
At its simplest, the process of social research is a dialogue between theory and 
evidence, with  
theory helping to make sense of evidence, and evidence modifying theory (Ragin, 
1994). We introduce these two theories, mundane reasoning and epistemic cultures, 
(both based on empirical findings), as being useful for gaining a deep understanding 
of organizational life. They are offered in the hermeneutic sense presented by Geertz 
(1979) when he talks about tacking between the global and the local. On the one hand 
there is the evidence of mundane reason (Pollner, 1987) and epistemic cultures 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999). On the other hand there is the theory of mundane reason and 
epistemic culture as presented in this paper. This ‘tacking’ between theory and 
evidence is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.Tacking between theory and evidence 
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In summary, the theory of mundane reason is described, followed by that of epistemic 
culture. The ontological position by each of the researchers - Pollner (1987) on 
mundane reason and Knorr-Cetina (1999) on epistemic culture - is stated followed by 
the proposal that, when taken together, they constitute a meta-ontology. Very often 
terms such as ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’, as in epistemic cultures, are saved for 
the rarefied world of the researcher. However, from experience and also from the 
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literature, there is much evidence that the study of these two theories could well 





The Notion of Mundane Reason and its Origin 
Ethnomethodology emerged in the mid-1960s as a theory and a self-conscious 
critique of conventional sociology (Marshall, 1994:203). Garfinkel (1967/1999) was 
the leading exponent and many academic researchers were attracted to his contention 
that “the most commonplace activities of daily life… are a phenomena [worthy of 
empirical research] in their own right” (Garfinkel, 1967/1999:1). Among these were 
Zimmerman and Pollner (1970) who argued that conventional sociological inquiry 
shared “identical conceptions of social fact” as the enquiry of the person in the street:  
 
each mode presupposes the existence of objective structures of activity which 
remain impervious to the procedures through which these features are made 
observable [and] each mode of inquiry addresses the same substantive domain 
(Zimmerman &Pollner, 1970:119). 
 
By 1974, Pollner had developed his theory of mundane reason which was described as 
follows: 
 
The assumption of an intersubjective world3 taken together with the inferential 
operations for which it provides comprises what we shall term the idiom of 
mundane reason. A well-socialized mundane reasoner…assumes a world 
which is not only objectively present but a world to which he has continued 
experiential access and, further, which others experience in more or less 
identical ways.(Pollner, 1974:35) 
 
Of course when we look at our examples of the senior executives/work groups and the 
judge/criminals, we can see that to assume that senior managers and workgroups as 
                                                 
3 ‘Intersubjective’ mean: accessible to or occurring between two or more conscious minds, as 
in ‘intersubjective reality’. (Longman, 1984) 
 8
well as judges and criminals share the same objectively present reality does not fall 
far short of fiction. People seem to want to preserve a fiction that they have 
experiential access to a single reality in an intersubjective way. Of particular interest 
in Pollner (1974) is his analysis of the ingenious way in which this fiction of 
intersubjective reality is maintained. We can think of reasoning as being done at two 
levels, the ‘edifice’ or surface level and the ‘foundational’ or deep level, As long as 
people can explain away evidence that only one reality is in play by addressing the 
edifice they can explain away discrepancies by pointing to such things as deficiencies 
in language, poor education, poor memory and so on. In this way, fundamental issues 
such as ‘the same descriptions are being accorded different factualities’ need not be 
an issue.  
 
Pollner (1987) calls this syndrome where different factualities are being accorded for 
the same descriptions, reality disjunctures. Reality disjunctures, (that is when two 
people interpret ‘reality’ differently) he maintains, are never fundamentally 
questioned – it is always the methods or motives of observation and reportage which 
are responsible for differing perceptions of the same event. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
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By 1987, Pollner had consolidated the case for mundane reasoning as a significant 
social phenomenon (Pollner,1987). However, the main theme remained the 
ethnomethodological concern to “transcend the constitutive and constraining character 
of the dominant form of life” (mundane reason) while at the same time having to 
return to the mundane reason of sociology “if it [ethnomethodology] is to contribute 
to the understanding of social life” (Pollner, 1987:6). 
 
In summary, Pollner (1987) showed that: 
• “The mundane idiom is the product of historical and cultural processes which 
have implanted the idiom deep within our discourse and consciousness” 
(Pollner, 1987:128) thus 
• “For most contemporary Western adults the assumption of an objective reality 
is virtually self-evident and thus truly mundane” (Pollner, 1987:x). 
• Sociology is mundane “like the rest of the sciences, and, for that matter like all 
modes of inquiry, it is directed to the explication and analysis of a world 
whose ‘thereness’ is considered to be essentially non-problematic (Pollner. 
1987:7). 
• Mundane reason is socially constructed. However, “Mundane reasoners 
always represent themselves as confronting a real world. Whether it is a world 
of concrete events such as ‘what really happened…’, a world of symbolic 
events such as ‘deviance’ or a world of abstract theoretical properties such as 
‘the practices through which social reality is constructed’… mundane 
reasoners describe the world as independent of the reflecting, experiencing, 
and describing” (Pollner, 1987:127) (Emphasis added) 
• The danger from mundane reasoning is the power it exercises in society, 
discourse and consciousness as “a fundamental resource for conceiving of 
oneself, others and the collective relation to reality” (Pollner,1987:128) and 




A Contemporary Interpretation of the Idiom of Mundane Reasoning 
The value of Pollner (1987) today lies in the analysis of his fieldwork which identifies 
and describes in detail the complexities of the process of mundane reasoning. This 
analysis has stood the test of time, yet does not appear to have been taken up by many 
other writers. 
 
Pollner’s (1987) misgivings about mundane reasoning are encapsulated in the 
following: 
 
Mundane reason is not simply an idiom founded on the assumption of an 
objective world. Rather it is an idiom which is composed of a network of 
interrelated, mutually defining terms for specifying both subject and object: it 
includes all of the terms whose meaning implicates and is implied by an 
objective world (Pollner, 1987:128). 
 
Thus, Pollner (1987) reflects a concern far wider than that of ethnomethodology for 
his contribution is a part of the reaction of the social sciences to the smugness of the 
natural sciences’ claims of objective knowledge; and his philosophical critique of 
mundane reason is a part of the emergence of postmodern thinking in many 
disciplines.4 
 
The importance for this paper of Pollner’s work lies in his research methodology: 
“The ethnomethodologists emphasize the interactional activities that constitute the 
social facts” (Coulon, 1995:50). Through studies of records of conversational 
interactions and the analysis of reality disjunctures Pollner (1987) showed how 
mundane reasoning sustains the assumption of an objective world to which all 
observers have access in everyday life.  
                                                                                                                                                    
                                                 




The Notion of Epistemic Culture and its Origin 
The term Epistemic Culture was coined by Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999) who was 
building on research started in the 1970s. She describes the phenomenon as follows: 
 
Epistemic cultures are “those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms - 
bonded through affinity, necessity, and historical coincidence - which, in any 




Over a number of years Knorr-Cetina (1999) researched two groups of scientists – in 
high energy physics and molecular biology - using a form of conversation analysis 
and documentary evidence, to determine the “construction of the machineries of 
knowledge” in each group. 
 
She observed that “The differentiating terms [discipline/scientific speciality] we have 
used in the past were not designed to make visible the complex texture of knowledge 
as practised in the deep social spaces of modern institutions. To bring out this texture, 
one needs to magnify the space of knowledge-in-action, rather than simply observe 
disciplines or specialities as organizing structures” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999:2). 
 
In summary, she concluded that: 
                                                 
5 During the preparation of this section the question was raised as to the difference between 
‘epistemic culture’ and ‘communities of practice’. The two appear similar as the following 
definition shows: 
 
Communities of practice are groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, 
or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise if this area 
by interacting on an ongoing basis (Wenger, McDermott, & Synder, 2002). 
 
However, there are fundamental differences: the existence of epistemic cultures was the 
outcome of fieldwork and analysis. ‘Communities of Practice’ is a common-sense 
management idea which is currently being advocated. “If communities of practice have been 
so pervasive [author’s claim], why should organizations suddenly focus on them?” (Wenger 




• There is a wide diversity in the ways in which epistemic cultures within 
science create knowledge. 
• The notion that there is “only one kind of knowledge, only one science, and 
only one scientific method …” is no longer plausible and there is ontological 
difference and methodological divergence within the practice of contemporary 
natural sciences. (Knorr-Cetina, 1999:3). 
• “The traditional definition of knowledge society puts the emphasis on 
knowledge seen as statements of scientific belief, as technological application, 
or perhaps as intellectual property. The definition I advocate switches the 
emphasis to knowledge as practised – within structures, processes and 
environments that make up specific epistemic setting.…” (Knorr-Cetina, 
1999:7). There is support for this broader interpretation of ‘knowledge’ from 
Giddens (1984) who asserts that ‘knowledge’ equals accurate or valid 
awareness. 
 
A heritage of functionalist ways of knowing and ways of evaluating knowledge 
(Morgan, 1997) is that what Knorr-Cetina calls the complex texture of knowledge has 
been slow to become recognized. The fact that there are ‘deep social spaces’ and that 
these need to be made socially intelligible to those interacting and conversing 
together. In other words, theories and practices aimed at helping people to 
communicate effectively need to rise above the traditional communication methods 
(active listening, summarising, confirming) to more reflective and analytical ones. 
 
Broadening the Notion of Epistemic Culture 
The work of Knorr-Cetina (1999) has an immediate appeal partly because it ‘makes 
sense’ and partly because of a natural respect for a researcher who goes to such 
detailed lengths to record and observe the creation of knowledge in practice. It takes 
very little imagination to apply the definition of an epistemic culture to society in 
general. For example, one might model the professional influences on a general 
practitioner in Western Australia as in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3  Modelling the Overlapping Epistemic Cultures which might 




















(eg Surgeons in Western Australia)
 
However, the question must be asked as to whether we are justified, on the basis of 
Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) empirical work, in extrapolating her findings. They are based 
on an exhaustive study of those working in the two scientific disciplines of high 
energy physics and molecular biology, to other groups in society. 
 
The argument proposed for the legitimacy of this move is as follows: 
 
• At present, the interpretation of the word culture is broad and general. For 
example, “in social science culture is all that in human society which is 
socially rather than biologically transmitted…” (Marshall, 1998:137). In 
management, culture is “something that is shared by all members of some 
social group”; something that older members of the group pass on to the 
younger members”; something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) 
that shapes behavior or structures one’ perceptions of the world” (Weinshall, 
1993:29). In summary, culture is a theoretical concept concerned with 
aggregate patterns and dynamics. 
• The traditional interpretations of culture take a macro-perspective while 
Knorr-Cetina (1999) used a close-up lens to study the machineries of knowing 
based on actual practices. In doing so she magnifies the epistemic machinery 
of two research cultures to reveal the fragmentation of the traditional notion of 
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a homogenous science. This approach has a fractal quality. Regardless of how 
much you narrow down and zero in on any specific area of culture, it contains 
essentially the entire structure of the object. This property of endlessly 
manifesting a motif within a motif is known, within complexity theory, as "self 
similarity" (Coveney & Highfield, 1995). 
• Knorr-Cetina (1999:252) herself argued that the results can be used “not by 
generalizing them, but by using the patterns I illustrate as templates against 
which to explore the distinctive features of other expert domains, and as 
pointers to dimensions in other areas”. 
• On methodology, Knorr-Cetina (1999:252) argued that “the liminal 
epistemology explored in Chapter 3….illustrates the working of ethnomethods 
such as unfolding, framing, and convoluting. These notions can be used as 
sensitizing concepts6 in any other study of epistemic cultures to determine 
how these cultures are figured, what similarities might exist, and how to 
account for them”. 
• In the United States, it has been argued that the concept of culture can provide 
ways of explaining belief systems, values and ideologies (Marshall, 
1998:137). The Knorr-Cetina (1999) interpretation would stress the 
importance of the mechanisms by which values etc. are created and passed on, 




Ontological questions are present in any attempt to conceptualize the 
individual within his or her social life. For philosophers, ontology has implied 
an investigation into the most general nature of things – into their ‘necessary’ 
structure. From this view, logical principles may be principles of being as well 
as principle of inference (Knorr-Cetina, 1999:253). 
 
Mundane reason is the folk ontology upon which both everyday and sociological 
discourse are dependent. Mundane reason is the production of ‘objective’ accounts of 
                                                 
6 For the role of sensitizing concepts in qualitative research see Ragin, 1994, pp.87-88. 
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human behaviour which are constructed while at the same time assuming there is a 
‘real’ world out there (Pollner, 1987).  
 
Researching epistemic cultures is not, according to Knorr-Cetina (1999), a matter of 
fixing ontology in advance of the empirical investigation. Each epistemic culture 
creates its own “forms of being or structures of existence” within its area (Knorr-
Cetina, 1999:253). Thus, taken separately, the practice of mundane reason and the 
behaviour in epistemic cultures appear to be at opposite poles of the qualitative 
researcher’s conventional view of ontology. This interpretation of ontological 
positioning is illustrated by Figure 4, taken from Guba and Lincoln (1994 ), 
reinforced by Lincoln & Guba (2000) which appears to have established a benchmark 
for qualitative researchers.  
 
Figure 4 The Traditional Ontology Choice using mundane reasoning. 










The mundane reasoner assumes a positivist or postpositivist position in discourse but 
his/her individual life is personally constructed. Epistemic cultures, on the other hand 
are socially constructed so that the individual may believe, in common with the others 
in the group that his/her ontology may lie at any one of the four points on the 
continuum. 
 
The theory of mundane reason and epistemic culture is in a position to take a bold 
step with regard to ontology because it recognises the multiplicity of approaches but 
cannot tolerate being assigned to one pole. Furthermore, the theory recognises the 
common ground thrown up by each empirical research: both show, without question, 
that the ultimate ontological position is constructivist when one looks behind the 
rhetoric of discourse.  
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Thus, it is proposed that it is more appropriate to represent the ontology of the theory 
of mundane reason and epistemic culture, which is essentially constructivist, as a 
meta-theory7 which is illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5 Locating the Theory of Mundane Reason and Epistemic Culture as 
a Meta-Ontology 
Positivism Postpositivism Critical Theory et al. Constructionism




This allows mundane reasoners to subscribe to a positivist position in the conduct of 
daily life (for example the ‘rule of law’) while taking part in the debate, a socially 
constructed activity, which creates the ‘rule of law” (for example the abortion debate). 
At the same time each epistemic culture socially constructs it’s ultimate beliefs, such 
as the sanctity of life in Western cultures, which is expressed in discourse from a 
positivist position as an objective value. 
 
There is no suggestion that the constructivist nature of the meta-theory is cognitivist 
with its emphasis on the individual mental process (Harré & Gillett, 1994; Potter, 
1996). There is the belief, however, that each individual person has a sense of reality 
                                                 
7 Schwandt (1994) draws a clear distinction between constructivist thinking (pp.125-127) and 
social constructionism (pp.127-8). Guba and Lincoln’s constructivist paradigm is described 
on pp 128-9, This proposal of a constructivist meta-ontology and a + constructionist 
paradigm enriches their perspective. 
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totally distinct from any other individual. It is the practise of mundane reason which 
overcomes the essentially idiosyncratic world of the individual allowing him or her to 
become part of a collective and shared reality. In other words, the isolation element 
from being a unique human being is overcome in everyday life through the 
functioning of mundane reason. 
 
Mundane Reason and Epistemic Culture as Theory 
 
The body of knowledge that constitutes our understanding of mundane reason and of 
epistemic cultures is a socially constructed product. The empirical observations of 
Pollner (1987) and Knorr-Cetina (1999) are inevitably mediated by our theoretical 
preconceptions. Among these is Giddens’ (1984:xvii) assertion that “Social theory has 
the task of providing conceptions of the nature of the human social activity and of the 
human agent which can be placed in the service of empirical work”. 
 
However, in a socially constructed world, the relation between theory and practice is a 
two way process which is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 










The subjective world-view through which we perceive data shapes the interpretation 
of data, while concurrently the data influences our world view. As we conduct 
research and present the results to colleagues, we initiate a ‘reflective conversation’ 
(Astley, 1985). This social process is encapsulated as follows: 
 
Data can be used effectively as a form of illustration having persuasive appeal 
for a theoretical interpretation…Empirical documentation, in this case, serves 
not as a device for verifying a theory’s agreement with objective fact, but as 
rhetorical support in persuading others to adopt a particular world-view. 
Because empirical data is always theory dependent, its main function is to 
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embellish rather than validate the theory from which it was generated (Astley, 
1985:510). 
 
Neither mundane reason or epistemic culture are theory: both are the product of 
empirical work, but it is proposed that, when combined, they take on a new entity, 
that is a separate, self-contained, independent existence. The Theory may be 
articulated as follows: 
 
Mundane reason is the predominant way of reasoning in the society in which we 
live. It assumes an objective world “out there” and some of the reasoning devices 
which support this assumption are known. Society organises itself into multiple 
epistemic cultures which function to underpin and create mundane reasoning. The 
differences in the quality of the mundane reasoning in the various epistemic 
cultures is largely determined by the strength, sophistication and power of the 
epistemic culture. 
The Theory of Mundane Reason and Epistemic Culture 
 
 
Two examples will suffice to illustrate the theory. First consider the courts of law 
which Pollner (1987) used to demonstrate mundane reasoning. In Western society 
“justice is blind” – a phrase which asserts the belief that impartial and objective 
judgements are capable of being made. In some countries, centuries of common law 
reinforced by the accumulation of statute law have served to provide the foundation 
for the epistemic culture of the nation state, expressed by citizenship and implying 
acceptance of the national law and the mundane reasoning upon which it relies to 
function. 
 
A second example is that of the multiple epistemic cultures within the academic 
world. Even within the study of management there is no discipline-wide agreement 
about analytical perspectives, methodology and even what constitutes the study of 
management itself! However, subgroups within the discipline, often based upon a 
 19
professional organisation or journal, converge on a given world view establishing 
conventions and orthodoxy (Astley, 1985). These are epistemic cultures. 
 
Re-theorising the Communications Process 
 
For sixty years the epistemic cultures of academic marketing and management have 
embraced a model for the study of communication which was based upon a theory 
which had no empirical justification .The American academic Wilbur Schramm 
(Schramm & Roberts, 1971; Schramm, 1948) proposed a model for the study of 














The power of this model was such that it was adopted by a wide range of academic 
disciplines. At that time there was some justification for this. The emphasis was on 
behavioural and cognitive psychology. This approach favours the study of an 
individual’s understanding of communication. Curiously, the ‘role’ of individuals in 
aggregate was left to disciplines such as the social and political ‘sciences’ to think 
about and theorise upon. 
 
The significance of cultural influences on communication is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon (Mantovani, 2000; Weinshall, 1993). Given the compartmental isolation 
of academic thought it is not surprising that academic communication researchers 
allowed model, such as the Schramm model, to become orthodox in their disciplines. 
MESSAGE
The Schramm Model of the Communications Process
SENDER CHANNEL RECEIVER
Who What How To Whom




The problem with orthodoxy is that the deep foundational thinking upon which it was 
originally built ceases to be questioned. The Schramm model appears to be a case in 
point and it still remains the starting point for textbooks (the received wisdom) both in 
management and marketing. 
 
The empirical research on mundane reasoning and epistemic culture, which was not 
carried out with this model in mind, exposes a basic flaw in the assumptions of the 
Schramm model.  
The Schramm model is, itself, the product of mundane reasoning which accounts for 
its natural common sense attraction. Communication is not a simple dialogic process 
in which senders and receivers exchange messages so that, through feedback it is 
supposed, mutual understanding results.  
 
The theory of mundane reasoning and epistemic culture offers an alternative for the 
study of communication. The basic model may be expressed as follows – Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 Epistemic Culture as a context within which Mundane 
Reason takes place 
I¹ I²
MR
Individual (I¹) communicates with Individual (I²) through
mundane reason (MR) which is shaped by the epistemic 





A basic formula to analyse communications would look like this: 
 
 C = MR EC
 
Where  C = Communication 
  MR = Mundane Reason 
  EC = Epistemic Culture 
 
 
The Theory in Action. 
  
Let us return to the Schramm model and apply the formula as above: C = MR EC
The sender sends a message. In order to send the message it will be given a factual 
status, according to the mundane reasoning of the sender’s MR group and also the 
kind of knowledge that is legitimated and valued within the sender’s epistemic 
culture. Where these are shared with the receiver, then communication is happening 
within the same basic framework that allows the same descriptions to become factual 
in nature. In other words, person one can talk to person two (either verbally or in 
print) in a way that each reasons like the other and each acquires and values 
knowledge in the same way. There are no reasoning or epistemic cultural barriers to 
the communication. 
 
If, however these conditions were not met, then there are several ‘thick’ barriers to the 
communication as soon as the message leaves the sender. The first barrier is the 
journey of the message through the communication channel. The metaphor is a one 
way street with cars coming in both directions. They are busy avoiding both each 
other and a collision. It is very likely that communication is something like the “1+1 





Figure 9. Each person is communicating within the vacuum of a different MR 
and EC  
 
 









Moving on to the feedback loop featured in the Schramm model, we can see that each 
communicator is in an autopoietic loop. This means that a communication will be 
self-perpetuating in the sense that it will attempt to preserve the status quo required 
for mundane reasoning and epistemic culture preservation, illustrated in Figure 10. 
 












Going back to the example at the beginning of the paper, the frustration of the senior 
executives lies with the fact that they have done everything within their power to 
couch the message in clear terms. Perhaps they have even gone to pains to make the 
language plain and everyday. Perhaps it is not the language that is the problem. 
Perhaps it is the organizing frameworks that executives use to give elements of the 
business strategy factual status. Or maybe the problem lies in the executives’ 
assumption that the work and customer groups share their world of mundane reason 
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when in fact it is likely that they will use different organizing frameworks to accord 




Why, one may ask, did this paper not start with an exposition of the formula: 
 
 C = MR EC
 
The reason is that academics in our discipline depend on the mundane reasoning 
of the management academic epistemic culture for these ideas to be 
communicated.  
 
Only when this has been pointed out, such as through the argument in this paper, are 
we able to strip away the building blocks of traditional representation. These often 
obscure understanding between individuals. An awareness of this helps us move 
towards a common understanding by recognising this new basic formula which is 
drawn to our attention by empirical research. The potential for applying this formula 
to other disciplines, such as communications and engineering, is both promising and 
exciting. At the very least, the theory of mundane reason and epistemic culture should 
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